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pages! Berger is, himself, the most frequently cited author in his 
bibliography, even without counting the citations to five reviewers 
of his books. 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed.). By Lau-
rence M. Tribe.1 Mineola, New York: Foundation Press. 
1988. P.p. 1778. $38.95. 
Stanley C Brubaker z 
In their response to the Supreme Court nomination of Robert 
Bork, the leading lights of the legal academy gave proof, if such 
were needed, that constitutional jurisprudence in America has been 
transformed. Of all the so called "extremist" positions for which 
Bork was pilloried before the Senate Judiciary Committee, not one 
lacked support from a liberal giant of yesterday, such as Herbert 
Wechsler, Hugo Black, or Bork's own mentor, Alexander Bickel. 
Yet at Bork's nomination hearings last fall, the legal academy pas-
sionately and overwhelmingly opposed him. Leading the charge 
was Laurence Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at 
Harvard Law School. 
Contemplating Professor Tribe's career, former Harvard Dean 
Erwin Griswold doubted if any legal scholar off the Court "has ever 
had a greater influence on the development of American constitu-
tional law." Perhaps an overstatement, but at forty-seven years of 
age, Tribe has compiled an impressive record. He has written or 
edited a dozen books and scores of influential articles; a leading 
casebook in constitutional law cites his commentaries nearly fifty 
times (more than twice the number for Bickel).3 He has won nine 
of the twelve cases he has argued before the Supreme Court. He has 
smooth relations with the media, and is their most frequently 
quoted source on constitutional questions. And he has close ties to 
liberal politicians, including some presidential aspirants. 
With his scholarly credentials, press relations, and political 
connections, Tribe weighed in heavily against the Bork nomination. 
He devised legal arguments for Democrats on the Judiciary Com-
mittee, rehearsed them in marathon sessions with Chairman Joseph 
I. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. This review is adapted 
from "Rewriting the Constitution," originally published in Commentary magazine, Dec. 
1988, p. 36. 
3. G. STONE, L SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, and M. TUSHNET, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1986). 
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Biden, and as lead witness for the Democrats testified against Bark 
for three hours on national television. Central to his attack was the 
charge that Bark stood outside the "mainstream" of American con-
stitutional jurisprudence. If the way the subject is taught in law 
school today is the "mainstream," Bark may indeed be standing in 
the dried river bed of yesterday. But if so, we might well ask where 
the academy's fresh currents would take us. With the publication 
of ~he second edition of his magnum opus, Tribe provides a river 
crmse. 
I 
Ten years ago when American Constitutional Law first ap-
peared, Tribe might have seemed an unlikely defender of the consti-
tutional mainstream. In the preface to that edition, he voiced 
disdain for "conventional scholarship" then still partly in the 
shadow of Alexander Bickel and other advocates of judicial re-
straint. He urged courts to take a more "candidly creative" role in 
achieving justice and denounced the Burger Court ("unduly be-
holden to the status quo") for its "distressing retreat" from this 
role. 
The notion of writing a "treatise" on constitutional law was 
itself both bold and ambitious, especially for a professor in his early 
thirties. Just three treatises of note had been published on constitu-
tional law, and of these, only the Commentaries of Joseph Story, 
published in 1833, made a serious effort to articulate the philosophy 
behind the Constitution. 
The philosophic dimension of Story's commentary was rich, 
profound, and elegant, but in one sense it was also comparatively 
straightforward. For him constitutional meaning was largely fixed. 
Its meaning was that envisioned by the framers, which was by and 
large as the Marshall Court-of which Story was a key member-
also understood it. In the late 1970s, however, Tribe saw it differ-
ently. For him, the Constitution evolves in a course that is ever 
more revelatory of an immanent meaning, a meaning unfathomed 
by the framers, unbound by the text, and only dimly perceived by 
the Supreme Court, which had been, nonetheless, haltingly pulled 
towards it. A mere casebook could no longer adequately portray 
the Constitution. Only a treatise, less bound to cases, more sensi-
tive to social theory, pointing the direction towards which doctrine 
is evolving, could provide the foundation for this "openly avowed 
effort to construct a more just constitutional order." In this new 
order there will be, he tells us, misappropriating a phrase from the 
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Constitution's Preamble, "a more perfect Union" between constitu-
tional rights and what is truly right. 
In the preface to his second edition, Tribe expresses embarrass-
ment at the "grand tone" of this first preface, positions himself 
above the controversies of left and right, and allows that the experi-
ence of the last ten years has given him a "deeper appreciation of 
the very great difference between reading the Constitution we have 
and writing the Constitution some of us might wish to have." The 
words conjure up an image of the elder statesman mildly amused by 
the impetuous energy of his youth; the reality is more nearly that of 
the revolutionary consolidating his hold on power. Backed by a 
legion of law professors come of age in the 1960s, Tribe now 
"reads" the Constitution that he "wrote" in the first edition. 4 The 
course of constitutional meaning that he set in the first edition has 
become the mainstream he charts in the second. 
Because a relatively brief essay cannot trace the many and 
finely nuanced arguments of this I, 778-page treatise, I wish to focus 
on its unifying structure and its underlying vision. In its outward 
organization, it does not differ from a casebook. The doctrines of 
separation of powers and federalism are followed by property 
rights, then personal rights of liberty and equality. What is distinc-
tive is the evolutionary significance Tribe gives to this organization. 
We might liken the growth of Tribe's constitution to that of a 
chambered nautilus. The early doctrines, or what he calls "mod-
els," like the inner chambers, once contained the vital parts; they 
are still part of the organism and perform useful functions-they 
keep us afloat-but their basic shapes were determined at moments 
in the organism's history and the vital meaning, the inner essence, 
has passed to newer regions. 
The continuing theme is freedom. Model I, "Of Separated and 
Divided Powers," is premised on the idea that freedom is best 
served by "deliberately fragmented centers of countervailing 
power."s Dominating constitutional debate from the founding to 
the Civil War, Model I suggested a high degree of trust in the integ-
rity and representational character of the new institutions; states 
were well represented in the federal government and individuals 
were well represented in the states. Thus the Court upheld claims 
of the federal government over those of the states and the claims of 
the states over those of the individual. That the Court of this era 
4. The move closely paralleb that of Michael Perry. who in his second book, MORAL-
ITY, Pouncs. AND LAW, ''interprets'' the Constitution to mean precisely what he had "non-
interpreted'' it to mean in THE CONSTITt.:TION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. 
5. TRIBE, at 2. 
472 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:431 
regularly sustained claims of state authority over individual rights 
does not damage the premise of a fundamental concern with free-
dom so much as delineate its character and underscore the belief 
that the interests of the individual were well represented in the state 
and a strong state government was necessary for protection against 
private violence and the threat of tyranny by the central govern-
ment. The persistence of slavery and the civil war demonstrated the 
inadequacy of Model I's reliance on state authority as a guarantor 
of rights. 
Chartered for a more direct protection of individual rights by 
the three Civil War amendments, but restrained by an abiding con-
cern with the danger of national tyranny, the Court eventually 
gained, by the end of the nineteenth century, a new understanding 
of freedom that allowed it to check state authority without raising 
the specter of an overpowerful central government. This is Model 
II, "Of Contractual Liberty." No longer content to trust the insti-
tutions to represent the appropriate sphere of interest, this model 
required the Court to define the appropriate spheres of federal, 
state, and private power-all this in the name of a laissez-faire the-
ory of property rights supposedly derived from nature itself and 
largely revealed in common law principles. By the 1930s, however, 
this model was enfeebled by growing doubt that it represented any 
true nature of things rather than a governmental choice of whom to 
protect through legal rules and whom "to abandon to the strength 
of others;"6 it soon collapsed beneath the weight of the Great 
Depression. 
Models III "Of Settled Expectations" and IV "Of Governmen-
tal Regularity," mostly concern property rights, like Model II, but 
outlive it as a model of constitutional decisionmaking. Their 
greater longevity is due in part to their more specific textual focus-
such as the just compensation and contract clauses-but more to 
their appearance of greater neutrality and objectivity than the "nat-
ural law" -inspired Model II. That appearance, warns Tribe, is an 
illusion, for these models are empty or circular unless they are filled 
out with substantive values, the origin of which lies external to 
them.? 
Because Model I implied a view of human rights that it pro-
tected only by indirection, Model II embraced an untenable and 
erroneous view of such rights, and Models III and IV have force 
only by reference to other more fundamental values, it is only with 
Models V "Of Preferred Rights: Liberty Beyond Contract" and VI 
6. !d. at 7. 
7. !d. at 7, 8, 608, 699. 
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"Of Equal Protection" that we come to the real substance of consti-
tutional law. Only with the advent of the Warren Court and the 
rise of contemporary constitutional commentators have we entered 
the higher stage of constitutional adjudication. Though the project 
has been stymied occasionally by benighted conservative appoin-
tees, the Justices (and more profoundly, the commentators) have 
begun to set forth the deep meaning of equality and freedom (or 
"autonomy," to use Tribe's preferred term for the latter). 
In these ideals of equality and autonomy, the Constitution is 
said to reveal its vision of human personality. Here, Tribe tells us, 
we are to find the "elements of being human," the "aspects of self 
which must be preserved and allowed to ftourish."s "The judiciary 
has thus reached into the Constitution's spirit and structure, and 
has elaborated from the spare text an idea of the 'human' and a 
conception of 'being' not merely contemplated but required."9 On 
this notion of human personality, the entire constitutional scheme 
must ultimately rest. to 
8. !d. at 778 and !308. 
9. !d. at 1308. Tribe also sketches a Model VII, "Of Structural Justice," in which he 
links the concern with individual rights with the structures of decisionmaking, giving primary 
attention to the concept of state action. For the most part, this model simply indicates some 
structural implications of the view of human personality developed earlier. !d. at 8. While 
the model is suggestive of the affirmative responsibilities Tribe envisions for the future devel-
opment of constitutional law, I shall not discuss it because it adds little to the notion of 
personality that informs Tribe's project. 
10. The overview sketched here closely follows that stated by Tribe, id. at 2-9, and as 
indicated in the above notes and the text that follows, the structure and argument it indicates 
are reinforced throughout the text. The tone of this overview also follows naturally Tribe's 
first preface where he announced in the first sentence that he was venturing "a unified analy-
sis of constitutional law;" this analysis would provide a "systematic treatment, rooted in but 
not confined to the cases" and "a coherent foundation for an active, continuing, and openly 
avowed effort to construct a more just constitutional order," an effort in which the Court 
would be urged to play a more "candidly creative role." !d. at vii-viii. 
Maintaining the tone of his second preface (and his deepening appreciation of the "very 
great difference between reading the Constitution we have and writing the Constitution some 
of us might wish to have"), Tribe in this edition displays a few phrases of doubt about efforts 
to find deep coherence in the Constitution. Drawing from his recent four -page essay criticiz-
ing Richard Epstein's effort, among others, to explicate the Constitution in terms of natural 
rights of property (37 J. OF LEG. ED. 170 (1987]), Tribe writes: "It may be that all efforts at 
such reduction or simplification, however suggestive, are ultimately more misleading than 
informative. For the Constitution is an historically discontinuous composition; it mirrors no 
single vision or philosophy but reflects instead a set of sometimes reinforcing and sometimes 
conflicting ideals and notions." !d. at I; see also 10 n.2 and 102 n.42. Had Tribe in any 
significant way changed the overarching argument of the first edition, or in fact become a 
follower of original intent, I would take more seriously this expressed concern for fidelity to 
constitutional origins. But Tribe continues to emphasize that fundamental constitutional 
concepts cannot be bound by text or intention. Consider, e.g., his statement that "principles 
of equal protection have emerged in ways fairly independent of particular constitutional 
phrases. What must be explicated here is thus truly a model-a way of looking at constitu-
tional issues generally-and not simply a section of the document." !d. at 1437. If anything, 
especially with his new "antisubjugation principle," infra, at notes 30-47 and 67-79, Tribe 
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Though Tribe's development of this idea is distinctly contem-
porary, the notion that our constitutional order rests on a vision of 
what it means to be human is not novel; such notions are often sub-
merged but never absent from serious reflections on government. 
To gain a clearer sense of what is at stake in Tribe's formulation, 
and thus the new "mainstream" of academic constitutional law, we 
should contrast his idea of human personality with that implied in 
earlier constitutional jurisprudence, what we might call, without ex-
aggerating the consensus behind it, the traditional understanding. 
II 
Human personality in the traditional understanding of liberty 
under the Constitution builds from two currents of thought, the lib-
eral and the republican. With boldness and lucidity, our Declara-
tion of Independence proclaims the liberal component in holding it 
self-evident that man is endowed with unalienable rights. Yet as the 
Declaration itself makes clear, these rights could be secured by 
many forms of government, including monarchy; for it was not 
monarchy that the document set itself against, but a particular 
monarch who had become a tyrant by his denial of rights. 
This is where republicanism came in. "No other form," 
Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers, "would be reconcilable 
with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental 
principles of the revolution; or with that honorable determination 
which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political ex-
periments on the capacity of mankind for self-government." To the 
framers, the claim that Americans were capable and worthy of gov-
erning themselves, was less a fully matured claim of the individual 
than a standard of public aspiration, less a claim of the subject than 
of the citizen, less a matter of inherent rights than of honorable 
determination. "There is no inherent right to self-government," Ir-
ving Kristol once wrote of this traditional understanding, "if it 
means that such a government is vicious, mean, squalid, and de-
based." 11 In a new context and with a distinctive vision, the repub-
lican ideal thus echoed the ancient idea of a human good. 12 
attempts in this second edition to state more profoundly than ever the underlying unitary 
justification of the Constitution. 
II. I. KRISTOL, ON THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 42 (1972). 
12. I should point out that my use of the term ··republican"' differs somewhat from that 
developed in the ··republican revival"' that swept American historians in the late sixties and 
seventies, see. e.g .. B. BAIL YN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION (1967), 1776-1787. and G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 
1776-1787 ( 1972), and is now influencing legal thinking, see, e.g .. Michelman, Traces of Self 
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) and Sherry, The Intellectual Origins of the Consti-
tution: A Lawyers Guide to Contemporary Historical Scholarship, 5 CONST. CoMM. 323 
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The confluence of the "republican" ideal of good character and 
"liberal" doubts about the competence of government itself to shape 
that character yielded the once fundamental distinction between lib-
erty and license. The "blessings of liberty," which the Constitution 
sought to secure, could never be compelled, but the abuse of liberty, 
or license, could be checked. Not surprisingly the line between lib-
erty and license in constitutional thought has never been clear or 
constant, and the idea of proper human character upon which it 
rests is to some extent always a matter of controversy. But the 
proposition that a sound constitution of government presupposes a 
sound constitution of man has, until recently, never raised a serious 
doubt. And while contemporary intellectual currents have eroded 
the confidence in such notions of human character and thus the dis-
tinction between liberty and license, they have not erased them from 
constitutional thought. 
Even in the early years of the Warren Court, when it consid-
ered whether obscenity was constitutionally protected speech, the 
conceptual residue was sufficient to imply in its very definition of 
obscenity a hierarchy in the elements of human personality. Ob-
scenity, the Court held, appealed to a "prurient interest," defining 
the latter as a "shameful or morbid interest in sex, nudity, or excre-
tion," and was "patently offensive"-offensive, that is, to sensibili-
ties that are properly cultivated by government and that are 
coarsened by the proliferation of obscenity. Obscenity, in short, of-
fends what is high and appeals to what is base in human character; 
lacking "a redeeming social value," it stands outside of constitu-
tional protection. 
If the general course of constitutional thought in recent years 
has been to wear away this distinction between high and low, it is 
Tribe's goal to wipe it out entirely. Of no small significance is the 
change in vocabulary he affects, for while liberty was traditionally 
understood in opposition to license, Tribe's preferred term, "auton-
omy," implies no such limit. 
An illuminating point of departure in considering Tribe's vi-
sion of autonomous personality is his attack on the "continuing sup-
pression of obscenity." During its later years, the Warren Court 
had significantly qualified its earlier definition of legal obscenity by 
emphasizing that the material in question, in addition to being pa-
tently offensive and appealing to a prurient interest, had to be "ut-
(1988). This tradition seeks to Ilnd in the American past a prebourgeois communalism, to 
revive and revise it, and apply it to the present. Without denying the presence of communal-
ism, I wish to emphasize that in the American republican tradition community itself was 
derived from notions of what constituted good character. 
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terly" (the Court italicized for emphasis) "without redeeming social 
value."u But the Burger Court, in another of what Tribe would 
number among its "distressing retreats," changed this latter crite-
rion to "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value." 14 To the usual complaint that there is no "scientific" proof 
that pornography has adverse effects, the Court, implicitly invoking 
the older understanding of human personality, pointed to the "well-
nigh universal belief that good books, plays and art lift the spirit, 
improve the mind, enrich the human personality and develop char-
acter," and asked rhetorically if we cannot logically infer the corol-
lary that obscenity corrupts and debases character.1s 
Tribe responded that the "parallel seems fatally flawed, for the 
state does not and could not compel its adult citizens, on pain of 
imprisonment, to read Dante, watch Shakespeare, or listen to 
Brahms. "1 6 A nice debater's point, perhaps, but no more. For the 
major thrust of the distinction between liberty and license is pre-
cisely that it is possible and desirable to forbid the abuse of liberty 
even though its better uses cannot and should not be compelled. 
That Congress may forbid its adult citizens to conspire and incite 
riots does not imply that it may compel them to compose and recite 
essays on civic virtue. 
In fact, Tribe is less intent on insisting that since the state can-
not compel the high it cannot forbid the low than he is on denying, 
as far as the Constitution is concerned, that there is any such thing 
as high and low, noble and base. Speech is speech, and obscenity, 
according to Tribe, generously defining his terms, is speech.17 We 
need not quarrel with Tribe's observation that obscenity employs 
the same media as speech-it takes the form of words or pictures-
but neither do we need to overlook the obviously distinct functions 
of speech and obscenity. Hardcore pornography is a mode of stim-
ulating the genitals, not the mind.1s Such distinctions, however, be-
come irrelevant, or rather inexplicable, from the perspective of 
Tribe's ideal of human personality, which can know neither nobility 
nor depravity. What inspires Lear is equal to what solicits leers. 
Hustler, like Hamlet, places an image before the mind, and in that 
sense makes one aware. To close out such awareness, writes Tribe, 
is "ultimately incompatible with the First Amendment's premise 
that awareness can never be deemed harmful in itself. For in the 
13. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,419 (1966). 
14. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973). 
15. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1972). 
16. L. TRIBE, at 917. 
17. !d. at 909. 
18. F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY l8J.84 (1982). 
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last analysis, suppression of the obscene persists because it tells us 
something about ourselves that some of us, at least, would prefer 
not to know." 19 
In other words, pornography laws are nothing more than a 
remnant of Victorian "hang-ups" about sex. As Tribe has to admit, 
the Court has distinguished proscribable pornography from erotic 
art, yet for him this distinction seems to render its rulings only the 
more disturbing, since a "selective tolerance for the tastefully sala-
cious, coupled with contempt for the coarsely vulgar" is utterly at 
odds with his view of autonomous personality according to which 
everything is a matter of taste.zo 
If all expressions of the self are intrinsically equal because there 
19. L. TRIBE, at 919. 
20. Even the exception that the Court has made to the unprotected status of pornogra-
phy, Stanley v. Georgia's holding that one has a constitutional right to possess pornography 
in the privacy of one's home, looks suspiciously elitist to Tribe, for it "tends to coincide with 
a distinction between polite society and hoi polloi; for protecting the living-room gathering 
around the privately owned film projector, but not the adult theatre crowd, smacks of eco-
nomic and cultural discrimination." L. TRIBE, at 919 n.96. It may seem odd that Tribe 
should follow this trashing of "prudish," id. at 928, approaches to obscenity with a section 
manifesting deep sympathy with the feminist attack on pornography (concluding, however, 
that many feminist inspired ordinances, such as that of Indianapolis, were "constitutionally 
overambitious," id. at 928). Nonetheless, there is an underlying consistency. For while the 
basic neo-Kantian project, which Tribe follows, seeks to maximize each person's "autonomy" 
in a manner compatible with a similar autonomy for others, the project does not prevent 
limiting autonomy when it is likely to cause harm to others. What it does prevent is one 
person's "subjugating" another according to his notion of the good life. Thus, under Tribe's 
model, religious beliefs, political ideas, obscenity, and drug induced states of mind-all what 
we might call "brain events"-must all be protected equally. This too is the position taken by 
radical feminists in their attack upon pornography: the traditional definition of obscenity, 
with its notion of prurient interests and a hierarchy of values, reflects and perpetuates patri-
archy. See Bryden, Between Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2 CONST. 
Co'-'IM. 147 (1985). Tribe can sympathize with these feminists, insofar as they profess to be 
concerned about the concrete harm the expression allegedly causes to women. 
No doubt pornography does cause harm. But if harm or violence is the measure, it 
would be easy to demonstrate that equal violence may ensue from speeches we think at the 
core of the first amendment; consider, for example, the speeches of abolitionists, civil rights 
activists, and anti-war critics. Thus we see the problematic nature of the neo-Kantian at-
tempt to erase all distinctions between liberty and license: the first amendment must either 
carry as its burden all the harm that may ensue from pornography and drugs or surrender all 
expression (equally) to state control once the expression reaches a certain level of probable 
harm. (R. Dworkin's free speech argument runs into similar difficulty. See R. DWORKIN, 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 335-72 (1985) and Brubaker. Taking Dworkin Seriously, 47 REV. OF 
Poi.. 45-67 (I 985]). 
It is more faithful to the intention of the framers, the presuppositions of republican gov-
ernment, and common sense to adhere, as the Court has done. to the traditional line: obscen-
ity appeals to a prurient interest-a morbid interest in sex. Typically, it creates, not an idea, 
but a mere physical sensation. The constitutional protection accorded it should be the same 
as for other sex stimulants and drugs; the state must merely demonstrate a rational basis for 
the legislation. Such "expression" ranks considerably below the realm of religious beliefs and 
political ideas. These should be protected against all but the most grave and immediate of 
harms. 
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is no external standard by which to assess them, then it follows that 
human consciousness itself has no natural perfection, no models of 
excellence towards which youth should be educated and none from 
which they should be steered. Thus with perfect though foolish 
consistency, Professor Tribe tells us that government may not in-
hibit an individual from altering his state of consciousness with ma-
rijuana and other more potent psychoactive substances. The ideal 
of autonomous personality would mean little, it seems, if the indi-
vidual could not choose to alter "the ways in which the mind 
processes the sensory data it receives from the world" and thus to 
alter by chemical reaction his perceptions of what is good and bad, 
virtuous and vicious, beautiful and ugly, and how he feels towards 
these things. Choices such as these "constitute an individual's 
psyche."21 Thus for government to suppress the consumption of 
such drugs and so to limit an individual's control over the processes 
of his mind is "perhaps the starkest form of governmental invasion 
of personality. "22 If one wants to express himself with words, he 
still may, of course-"just say no." But if one wants to find himself 
with drugs, the Constitution, according to Tribe, must say yes.2J 
If the Constitution must be indifferent to modes of conscious-
ness, at least where there is no provable harm to others, then it must 
also be indifferent to modes of intimate association, at least among 
consenting adults. Though he includes phrases seemingly designed 
to give him "plausible deniability," Tribe attributes to the Constitu-
tion a strong presumption in favor of all consensual sexual associa-
tions24 which includes (in addition to homosexual sodomy), rights 
to homosexual marriage and polygamy.2s Even incestuous relations 
are "not necessarily" foreclosed from constitutional protection. A 
state "could perhaps" make a "plausible argument" for banning 
prostitution and "at least a colorable argument" against sadomas-
ochism and bondage because both might involve an excessive risk of 
coercion, but he judiciously withholds judgment on these questions. 
He does express doubt that there is a constitutional right to bestial-
21. L. TRIBE. at 1324 and 1326. 
22 !d. at 1312. 
23. Tnbe is not explicit about which substances would be protected. Marijuana is to be 
protected, but not, it seems, heroin. As for the rest. the standard seems that of equal protec-
tion: the government cannot prohibit any psychoactive substance of equal or lesser potency 
than the most potent substance it permits. Today alcohol would seem to set the pace. He 
lays the path for the protection of peyote and its derivative, mescalin, by noting its impor-
tance for the religious autonomy of certain Native Americans, id. at 1247-49, and by urgmg 
the assessment of claims for religious autonomy, not from any "objective" perspective, but in 
terms of "the role a belief plays in the individual's or group's life," id. at 1182. an assessment 
which seems tantamount to equating religious autonomy with plain autonomy. 
24. !d. at 1432. 
25. /d. at 1434. 1271 and 1434 n.89. 
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ity,26 but leaves the reader wondering why a constitution, broadly 
indifferent to the sexual conduct of humans, should manifest such 
solicitude for the sexual propriety of animals. 
The pivotal case for Tribe's program of autonomy is Roe v. 
Wade, for if the claim of autonomy can be made forceful enough to 
defeat the state's interest in preserving the life of a fetus, surely it 
will defeat the apparently less compelling, or at least more abstract 
interest of the state in preserving the moral tone of the community. 
Yet the Court's reasoning in Roe was notoriously weak; its basic 
point-that the Constitution's protection of liberty "is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy"-was simply an ipse dixit. 
Recognizing this weakness, Tribe has abundantly invested his 
creative talents in the task of defending Roe, devising four distinct 
justifications since 1973. Initially he claimed that laws prohibiting 
abortions represented an "establishment" of religion in violation of 
the first amendment.n A couple of years later, he withdrew from 
that position, acknowledging that it unduly restrained the political 
liberty of religious groups and underestimated the moral arguments 
against abortion that did not derive from specifically religious foun-
dations. Instead, he claimed that when opinion on moral questions 
is in a state of flux, but the political process is deadlocked from 
change by groups committed to the old moral consensus, the judici-
ary can intervene to allow the evolution of a new moral consensus.2s 
That argument was patently disingenuous, for Tribe's "libera-
tion" of the polity allows it to develop a "new consensus" only be-
hind the Court's opinion; the people cannot choose to restore the 
old moral order unless they manage to amend the Constitution or 
the Court reverses itself. Perhaps recognizing its flaw, Tribe barely 
alluded to this argument in his first edition of American Constitu-
tional Law.29 Instead, he argued (in his third stab at the issue) that 
the exceptions in the typical abortion law-such as for rape, incest, 
or the life of the mother-indicated a less than "coherent commit-
ment" to fetal life to be weighed against the woman's claim of au-
tonomy, and thus abortion laws "in the historical circumstances of 
the 1970's can be perceived as unwarranted deprivations of lib-
erty. "3o In the second edition, this vacant argument too is quietly 
26. !d. at 1432 n.77. 
27. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a .11odel of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 
HARV. L. REV. I, II, 15, 22 (1973). 
28. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HAR\. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 269-321, esp. 317-18 
(1975). 
29. L. TRIBE, AMERICA:-i CO~STlTCTlONAI LAW 929 (1st ed. 1978). 
30. !d. at 932. 
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interred. In its place, Tribe offers what is probably his most re-
vealing statement yet on human personality. 
This is the antisubjugation principle.Jt Although the Court, 
and Tribe himself until recently, missed it entirely, it turns out that 
the essential fault with laws forbidding abortions (and with laws 
failing to fund them) lies in "the subordination of women to men 
through the exploitation of pregnancy. "32 Through abortion laws, 
it seems, and in violation of the thirteenth as well as the fourteenth 
amendment, "male dominated society" "sentences" women into 
"involuntary servitude," or forced labor.J3 Tribe does not mention 
that women are as likely as men to oppose abortion; these women 
apparently suffer false consciousness and hence desire their own 
subordination. Nor does he mention that men generally are una-
ware of their having such a malign purpose; like the capitalists de-
scribed by Marx, men do not intend to exploit, but do so as a result 
of the "system." 
Here the system is biology. After a woman engages in sexual 
intercourse and conceives a child, she can avoid the personal sacri-
fice of childbearing only with the help of an abortionist. She is un-
like a man who simply by his own refusal could avoid, for example, 
the sacrifice of one of his kidneys to save his child's life. 34 Given the 
burdens of pregnancy and childrearing, unless women can termi-
nate pregnancy, they cannot be the equal of men in society. "Even 
a woman who is not pregnant is inevitably affected by her knowl-
edge of the power relationships thereby created."35 So when a state 
bans abortions, refuses to fund them, or assists childbirth but not 
abortion, it "exploits this special vulnerability of women in a way 
that reinforces their subordination to men, and thus their lack of 
fully autonomous and equal roles in social, economic, and political 
life."J6 By contrast, Tribe muses, "the law nowhere forces men to 
devote their bodies and restructure their lives in those tragic situa-
tions (such as organ transplants) where nothing less will permit 
their children to survive. "37 
That such organ transplant laws do not now exist is due more 
to lack of need than to principled opposition. In any event, we do 
ask men to bear significant hardships for the sake of others, as when 
we draft them (but not women) for military service and combat 
31. Tribe uses subjugation and subordination interchangeably. 
32. L. TRIBE, at 1353. 
33. !d. at 1354. 
34. !d. at 1355. 
35. /d. at 1354. 
36. !d. at 1355. 
37. !d. at 1354. 
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duty. Yet Tribe's notion of individual autonomy would function as 
if there were principled and constitutionally based opposition to 
such organ transplant laws and to military service (which, by the 
logic he develops in the abortion controversy, would also raise a 
thirteenth amendment claim of involuntary servitude). 
By such reasoning do we proceed from the idea that everything 
is a matter of taste to radical doubts about the morality of the draft. 
Nor is the chain of logic altogether surprising, for as Solzhenitsyn 
has observed, where liberty degenerates into simple "unlimited free-
dom in the choice of pleasures," it becomes impossible to answer 
"why and for the sake of what should one risk one's precious life in 
defense of the common good?"Js 
III 
If Tribe's notion of "autonomy" provides the most striking dis-
plays of his view of human personality, his conception of equality 
holds more pervasive and more radical implications for the Ameri-
can political system. Here again, we can best understand Tribe's 
view by contrasting it with the traditional understanding, focusing 
on the issue of racial equality. 
According to that traditional view, the basic moral fault of le-
gally imposed discrimination lies in prejudice, that is, in bringing 
race to bear on judgments of merit or fitness. There is a moral fault 
in the process, when government attributes to race itself a worth it 
lacks, and there is moral fault in the outcome-material harm and 
the resulting stigma, the marking of the racial group as lacking in 
estimable qualities of human character. Thus, even where the le-
gally imposed disadvantages are materially small-sitting in the 
back of the bus, swimming in a different pool, and attending a dif-
ferent school, where objective features may even be identical-still, 
these laws make judgments about worth and character, and so they 
inflict bitter wounds. Further, exactly because these are judgments 
about estimable human qualities-intelligence, industry, truth-
worthiness, hygiene-qualities that are widely relevant to social and 
economic positions, the material harms are not small or discrete, 
but cumulative and large. The traditional understanding holds that 
such judgments can only be made of an individual, not of the racial 
group to which he or she belongs. 
Adherents to this tradition are unabashed in honoring merit, 
for it is primarily by such standards, before which we are judged 
impersonally and equally and given what we deserve, that consider-
38. A. SOLZHE:-.IITSY!'>, A WORLD SPLIT AP.·\RT 15 ( 1978). 
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ations of race become irrelevant and invidious. The prize goes to 
the swiftest, the position of trust to the most trustworthy, the job to 
the applicant best fit to perform it. To bring forth the best in us, the 
traditional approach welcomes both extra effort in training the dis-
advantaged and wider nets for recruitment. But it views "preferen-
tial treatment"-giving race a worth in the actual award of jobs, 
prizes, or positions, in the name of racial fairness-as a threat to 
standards, merit, and thus to genuine equality. As Solicitor Gen-
eral Charles Fried recently stated the case before the Supreme 
Court, "Henry Aaron would not be regarded as the all-time home-
run king, and he would not be a model for youth, if the fences had 
been moved in whenever he came to the plate."39 
Rules that discriminate on their face, such as a rule denying 
blacks admission to a state university, are virtually per se unconsti-
tutional under the traditional approach. The more difficult problem 
is with rules or policies that are neutral on their face, but affect the 
races differently, such as zoning rules affecting low-income housing. 
The traditional approach is to declare such laws unconstitutional if 
their purpose is to discriminate. But where there is no discrimina-
tory purpose, there is no morally objectionable process, no resulting 
stigma, and no constitutional fault. There may remain a resulting 
hardship, but it is not different from what each citizen suffers as the 
occasional loser in legislative contests. Thus, when a municipality 
sells a public swimming pool to a private club, the material effects 
may be the same, but it makes a world of moral and constitutional 
difference whether the motives were to preserve scarce public funds 
or to prevent blacks from mingling with whites. 
The distinction is crucial, for given the different demographic 
characteristics of racial and ethnic groups-average age, education, 
family size, wealth, income-legislation often harms one group 
more or benefits it less than others. Sales taxes, professional license 
requirements, minimum wage legislation, welfare support levels, 
and countless other laws and policies all have disparate impacts 
among racial groups. These laws may be bad, and if so they should 
be modified or repealed, but they are not unconstitutional. 
To be sure, figuring out why a legislature enacted a policy is 
not always easy. Often a lawmaker is trying to accomplish several 
things for many reasons: pursue sound public policy in a high-
minded public spirit, gain re-election, reward friends, weaken oppo-
nents, etc. The traditional approach is to ask whether the legisla-
ture had sufficient legitimate reasons to support the law; or 
alternatively stated, would the law have passed "but for" racial 
39. Quoted in 43 Co:-oGRESSIOS-\1 QLARTERLY 2104 (Oct. 1985). 
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prejudice?40 If it seems likely that the law would not have been 
enacted without such racial prejudice, it is declared unconstitu-
tional. In most cases the matter is clear; in marginal cases it is less 
so. But in all cases the inquiry is necessary, for the alternative, to 
focus exclusively on material effects and require that all laws affect 
each racial or ethnic group identically, would result in mandatory 
color coding of virtually all governmental policies, the abandon-
ment of standards, or blatant color consciousness in the design of 
tests or standards to ensure that the results come out with the 
proper racially proportionate mix. 41 
With his newly discovered "antisubjugation principle," Tribe 
would chart just such an alternate course. The "purpose" test, he 
claims, is "utterly alien to the basic concept of equal justice under 
law." After all, he asserts, "[t]he burden on those who are subju-
gated is none the lighter because it is imposed inadvertently."42 
Given the need to color code all social and economic legislation if 
one focuses exclusively on the material effects of the law, plus the 
difficulty of defining a hardship as a denial of racial equality in the 
absence of a discriminatory purpose, it is hard to believe that Tribe, 
despite his rhetorical flourishes, is entirely serious. And as it turns 
out, he is not-at least not entirely. For as he moves closer to prac-
tical applications, he does end up defining the relevant "effects" of 
the law in terms of the lawmaker's state of mind. His innovation 
here is not exactly, as he initially claims, to turn from purpose to 
effect, but to move from conscious to subconscious states of mind. 
For contemporary racism, he maintains, consists less of conscious 
hostility than it does of subconscious patterns of thought that 
render the majority race more concerned for its own well being than 
for that of minorities. In deciding the constitutionality of a law 
under his antisubjugation principle, Tribe would have courts ask 
roughly the following question: Taking into account their subcon-
scious motives, would the lawmakers have enacted this law if its 
disadvantages were to fall on them and "their kind"? 
A Golden Rule for the subliminal, the approach is not without 
moral charm. Yet it has problems. If a lawmaking body is told that 
it subconsciously subjugated a people, how is it to respond? If con-
scious purpose is at stake, the words of the lawmakers may be sus-
pect, but if it is their subconscious state of mind that is in question, 
not only their words, but their very thoughts are suspect. Like the 
40. See. e.g .. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977). 
41. For a heroic defense of the contrary position, see Perry, The Disproportionate Im-
pact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 25 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). 
42. L. TRIBE. at 1519. 
484 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:431 
psychoanalyst who stands above the subterranean forces that drive 
the rest of us, the courts-in Tribe's view-occupy a privileged po-
sition above the racism buried in the minds of others and thus have 
special competence to pronounce whether the law and its effects im-
ply a properly pure subconscious. In practice, of course, the answer 
will depend on whether the results come out "right." 
That this makes his concession to state of mind analysis nuga-
tory, however, is perhaps the least of the problems with Tribe's anti-
subjugation principle. Far more troubling is its abandonment of the 
traditional emphasis on standards of merit, and the consequent 
transformation of the understanding of human personality that un-
derlies the Constitution. The traditional approach takes its moral 
bearings from a vision of human personality with estimable charac-
ter, talents, and traits; the wrong of racial discrimination is the 
judgment that a people, because of its race, is lacking in these and is 
therefore unfit for a position, prize, association, or benefit. Its typi-
cal claim is one of justifiable outrage: "Because of my race, you 
denied me what I deserve." For Tribe, the question is not one of 
fitness, or merit, or desert, but of distributive fairness. Its claim is 
thinned to a whine, "You gave them more than me." As we saw in 
his discussion of autonomy, Tribe's aim is to level the vision of con-
stitutional personality, so it is not altogether surprising that he 
should seek to define equality without reference to anything that 
makes mankind admirable; such judgments inevitably subjugate one 
person to another's notion of what is good in and for men and wo-
men. What is remarkable is the loss of moral authority that Tribe's 
principle brings. Subtract from racial discrimination the idea of 
prejudice, the judgment that an individual, because of his race, lacks 
desirable human qualities and talents, and in what sense does the 
remaining discrimination present a significant moral or constitu-
tional wrong? At some time or other, each of us is disfavored by 
legislative policy: the tariff that favors manufacturers over farmers, 
the labor law that favors workers over managers, the airline deregu-
lation that diminishes service to small towns. If we simply ask 
Tribe's question-would the lawmakers have enacted that policy if 
they came from the same group as the disadvantaged-then the 
laws disadvantaging farmers, managers, and small towns become 
indistinguishable from those harming racial groups. 
As Tribe thus drains the moral force from equal protection, he 
at the same time vastly extends its reach and the scope of "reme-
dies" for its violation. Because the traditional view respects the 
standards of fitness set by society and state, it regards our posses-
sions, opportunities, and honors as properly ours, unless their distri-
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bution was infected with identifiable racial prejudice. Because 
Tribe's antisubjugation principle employs an abstract standard of 
fair distribution, it regards all that we have as potentially subject to 
redistribution to make it conform to what would have emerged 
from a hypothetically pure state of mind. Thus Tribe would not 
hesitate to extend legal remedies to what might be thought the con-
sequences of acts that occurred decades or centuries earlier. In-
deed, it seems the chief problem with our present racist 
subconscious is its blind indifference to the way seemingly neutral 
policies, rules, and tests perpetuate the "virulent vestige of centuries 
of official subjugation. "43 Thus where the traditional approach 
finds occasional and discrete acts of racial prejudice by today's 
lawmakers, Tribe's antisubjugation principle sees institutional ra-
cism pervading contemporary America.44 
To "dismantle this house that racism built,"4 s according to 
Tribe, we must create the situation, often by the direct redistribu-
tion of opportunities, that would have occurred if racial animus did 
not lurk beneath our present consciousness and if more manifest 
discrimination did not stain our past. Tribe's own design, while not 
lacking in curb appeal, is morally dubious both in structure and 
substance. It is jerrybuilt from a twofold hypothetical-if we had 
not discriminated in the past and if we did not remain at least sub-
consciously racist-and an unlikely claim that courts know the mo-
tives of lawmakers far better than they do. He would license a free 
ranging judicial imagination to write the story of what would have 
been and then to orchestrate its enactment. 4 6 As thus extended, his 
43. !d. at 1521. 
44. !d. at 1518. 
45. L. TRIBE, CONSTITL"TIOSAL CHOICES 221 (1985). 
46. Courts. in Tribe's scheme, clearly must take the lead in defining constitutional 
rights and indicating what is necessary for their vindication. On the extent to which they 
should be involved in the actual design and implementation of remedies he is decidedly am-
biguous. Discussing school desegregation, the field where courts have been involved most 
extensively in broad systemic remedies, he initially expresses determination that courts 
should do whatever is necessary-separation of powers concerns be hanged: "If all vestiges 
of racial isolation in the public schools are to be 'eliminated root and branch; the federal 
courts will require discretion to formulate remedies as complex, continuing, and wide-ranging 
as the problem they confront," TRIBE, at 1500. 
Elsewhere he is more equivocal. He ventures the theory, for example, that the Court has 
failed to embrace his anti-subjugation principle, not because it sees something wrong with his 
theory, but because the Court is concerned about the extensive remedies such a theory would 
entail. Rather than "masquerading" it' decisions in the language of rights the Court's 
"proper course," he tells us, "would have been to confront the remedial challenge head on: 
either grit the teeth and get to work fixing the inequality, no matter what it takes, or swallow 
hard and acknowledge that the constitutional wrong cannot be judicially put right," id. 1512 
(my emphasis). 
In the context of other affirmative rights, he does state more forthrightly that there are 
limits to the capacity of courts to provide remedies for the rights it announces (without ever 
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goal of fairness stands at odds with the idea of merit. Instead of 
asking who is most qualified for a position, Tribe would have us ask 
who would have been most qualified if our past had been what it 
should have been. Maybe the sixteen less qualified minorities who 
displaced Allan Bakke from admission to the Davis medical school 
would have had higher qualifications than he if the past had been 
otherwise. Maybe Brian Weber would not have had that appren-
ticeship. Maybe Michael Tyson would not have been heavyweight 
champion. Maybe the Nobel Prize for physics would have gone to a 
currently unknown minority. Maybe .... 
Undaunted by the task of identifying what this doubly hypo-
thetical situation would have been, untroubled by the expansion of 
judicial and governmental authority required to achieve it, Tribe is 
most decidedly unimpressed by the cost to individual desert and 
merit necessary to obtain this idea of a fair distribution among ra-
cial groups. While the traditional approach gains its moral force 
from the belief that people should get what they deserve, the an-
tisubjugation principle gains its force from the doubt that people 
deserve what they have. The traditional approach seeks to ensure 
that desert is cleansed of racial discrimination; the antisubjugation 
principle seeks to redistribute goods according to a hypothetical cri-
terion of racial fairness. The traditional approach appeals to the 
honor of mankind, the antisubjugation principle appeals to guilt 
and doubt.47 Where Alexander Bickel held it a moral underpinning 
of the Constitution that we should honor the expectation of men 
and women of all races "to succeed by hard work and to better 
themselves by making themselves better, " 48 Tribe tells us that the 
expectations of whites in the context of contemporary racist 
America "are likely to be inflated, if not wholly unfounded."49 
specifying what those limits might be). But this very question of judicial competence to pro-
vide remedies arises almost entirely from his extraordinarily expansive ideas of what those 
rights are. (Working from cases such as Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165 [1952], he charts, 
for instance, the evolution of a right to "bodily integrity," and hopefully sketches the devel-
opment from a presumptive right to be free from governmental invasion of the body to a right 
to governmental care of the body. For "governmental omtssion can be as deadly as the most 
pointed of governmental acts," td. at 1336.) And the definition of those rights, he leaves no 
doubt, is the job of the courts. That he might then enlist the powers of the sword and the 
purse to implement his ideas of rights (or to suffer the ignominy of violating the Constitution) 
should bring small comfort to anyone concerned about the expansive role the judiciary plays 
in our democratic system of government. 
47. In one of his more remarkable displays of chutzpah, Tribe also appeals to a theory 
of "original intent," claiming, "the antisubjugation principle is faithful to the historical ori-
gins of the Civil War amendments," id. at 1516. and denouncing what I have called the 
traditional approach as "creative constitutionalism," an "activist" reading that "revises the 
fourteenth amendment at its most basic level." !d. at 1516. 
48. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). 
49. L. TRIBE, at 1537. It is in light of comments such as these that we should under-
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The difference between the traditional approach and Tribe's 
antisubjugation principle is nicely illustrated by the case of Wash-
ington v. Davis. At issue was "Test 21," used by the District of 
Columbia police department to evaluate language skills in the selec-
tion of recruits. Developed by the Civil Service Commission, the 
test was widely used by the federal civil service, proven to be a relia-
ble measure of success in the police training program, and though it 
had not been tested in relation to job performance, the job of a po-
liceman does require, as the majority opinion pointed out, "special 
ability to communicate orally and in writing."so There was no evi-
dence of any purpose to discriminate either in the adoption or in the 
administration of this test. Following the traditional approach, the 
Court held that the relevant constitutional question was one of pur-
pose (assuming consciousness of purpose), not mere effects, and the 
mere fact that blacks failed the test at a higher rate than whites did 
not render it unconstitutional. 
Not a single Justice in Washington v. Davis dissented from this 
statement of constitutional principle.st Yet it is here that Tribe de-
nounces the obligation to show purpose as "utterly alien to the basic 
concept of equal justice under law."s2 Where the Court looked for 
prejudice and found none in this modest endeavor to upgrade the 
language skills of a police force, Tribe looked for "legally created or 
legally reenforced systems of subordination that treat some people 
as second class citizens,"53 and for conditions, which "in their social 
and historic context, are manifestations of official oppression"s4 and 
found them in Test 21. 
"Oppression," ·•systems of subordination," and "second class 
citizenship" might seem extravagant ways to describe the use of a 
carefully designed language skills test by a police department, more 
than forty percent of whose members were black (a figure 
equivalent to the racial mix in the metropolitan area), whose re-
cruits were more than fifty percent black,ss and that had, as the 
majority opinion pointed out, "systematically and affirmatively 
stand Tribe's suggestion that "property rights" in the Constitution must be understood as 
mere reflections of the more fundamental values of equality and autonomy, and thus qualified 
appropriately. /d. at 7, 8. 608, and 699. Thus, it would be a rare white in contemporary 
America, who could claim that his property interests were "taken" by an affirmative action 
plan. 
50. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976). 
51. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, would have decided the case for Davis, 
but on a statutory ground. 
52. L. TRIBE, at 1519. 
53. /d. at 1515. 
54. !d. at 1516. 
55. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972); Davis v. Washington, 512 
F.2d 956, 961 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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sought to enroll black officers."s6 Tribe, however, finds sufficient 
manifestation of official oppression in the link between the higher 
failure rate of blacks and the District's history of segregated 
schools, a link he calls "obvious." Since the segregation had ended 
twenty years earlier and since the evidence is at best ambiguous that 
the quality of education and test performance has improved during 
those years, this link would appear problematic to most. But with a 
zeal and singularity of vision more commonly found in ideological 
tracts than legal treatises, Tribe assesses disparate impacts, such as 
that resulting from Test 21, as if they were known to be results of a 
"system of subjugation." 
Because we must deal, according to Tribe, with "systems" of 
subjugation rather than mere "acts" of discrimination, massive legal 
intervention, or "systemic remedies" will be frequently needed. Ac-
cordingly, to root out all traces of "subjugation" in the public 
schools, Tribe advocates eliminating the well established distinction 
between de jure and de facto segregation, a distinction that has been 
unanimously accepted by the Justices.s7 That is, regardless of 
whether the state or the local school board had committed any sort 
of discriminatory act (de jure segregation), public schools would be 
vulnerable to court integration orders until their populations show 
the "proper" racial mix, that is, the sort of mix that he presumes 
would have occurred if our past had been what it should have been 
and if our present subconscious racism did not perpetuate the past. 
Until then, Tribe maintains, the Constitution must allow federal 
courts the discretion to formulate system-wide remedies, "remedies 
as complex, continuing, and wide-ranging as the problem they con-
front."ss Racial quotas, busing, redrawing of district lines without 
regard to neighborhoods or municipal boundary lines, and redraw-
ing the lines again if the population movements upset the court es-
tablished quotas--one searches American Constitutional Law in 
vain for a desegregation remedy that Tribe thinks goes too far. 
Like school districts, governments themselves will have to be 
reformed if they fail to produce the proper racial mix of representa-
56. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1976). In fact, it seems plausible that 
the higher failure rates among black applicants was due in part to that same affirmative effort, 
for in its aggressive recruitment efforts for blacks-whites were essentially self-selected-the 
police department cast a wide net likely to provide a lower yield; though blacks in the metro-
politan area constituted only forty-four percent of the population, the recruitment effort 
brought an applicant pool that was seventy-two percent black. (Lerner. Employment Dis-
crimination, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 17, 25 n.23 and 27 n.26). Tribe's antisubjugation principle 
would go a long way to ensure that good deeds not go unpunished. 
57. Powell once toyed with but then dropped the idea of eliminating this distinction. 
Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
58. L. TRIBE, at 1500. 
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tives. Consider how Tribe would have handled Mobile v. Bolden. 
In this case, a complaint was brought against the commission form 
of government adopted by the city of Mobile, with its system of at-
large election for the three commissioners. The allegation was that 
this system of election and government, which is used by thousands 
of municipalities across the country, had the effect of "diluting" the 
black vote. 
The District Court found no purpose to discriminate in the 
adoption of the city's commission form of government and electoral 
system, the drawing of its municipal boundary lines, or in access to 
the ballot, and no deviation from the principle of one person, one 
vote. The judge decided nonetheless to transform the government 
to a mayor/council system with single member districts-this in or-
der to enhance the chances of electing more black representatives. 
As Justice Stewart pointed out in his plurality opinion for the 
Supreme Court reversing this decision, one could speak of vote "di-
lution" under the circumstances of this case only on the absurd as-
sumption that every minority group "has a federal constitutional 
right to elect candidates in proportion to its numbers." 59 
Tribe, however, praises the lower court's remedy and attacks 
the Supreme Court's reversal of it; he embraces precisely the notion 
of "vote dilution" the Court rejected. 60 And from the perspective of 
his antisubjugation principle, he does so logically, for when just pro-
cedures-procedures free from discriminatory purpose-are dis-
placed from the center of equal protection analysis, there is little to 
which one can point as a standard of evaluation except a fair distri-
bution among racial groups, meaning here a proportional represen-
tation according to race. 
Tribe, it seems clear, would find equal protection violations 
where the Court has never discovered them before and extend race 
conscious "remedies" far beyond anything the Court has ever sanc-
tioned. Yet the permissiveness of the antisubjugation principle to-
wards racial criteria does not stop with mere remedies of even 
distant wrongs. Even when there is no evidence of past discrimina-
tion, as long as the aim is to bring about Tribe's new order where all 
positions of advantage and disadvantage show the proper racial 
mix, legislators and private actors are encouraged to employ the 
criteria of race. In fact, if the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that moral 
monument of the twentieth century, were understood according to 
its original intent-as a prohibition of discrimination "against any 
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
59. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75 (1980). 
60. L. TRIBE, at 1506-07. 
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gin"-it would have to be declared unconstitutional, according to 
Tribe, for it would then block this "forward looking" affirmative 
action.6I 
Beyond issues of race, Tribe's antisubjugation principle would 
extend its standard of mental purity to issues of sex, sexual orienta-
tion, and more. Women's colleges would have to go, unless they 
could prove that they functioned as a "remedial haven for women 
from the hierarchy of domination in the 'man's world' of higher 
education;"62 men's colleges do not have a prayer. Women equally 
with men must be eligible for the draft and combat duty.63 Laws 
with disparate impacts on homosexuals would also fall under this 
principle,64 including, one presumes, laws that favor heterosexual 
over homosexual couples in the adoption of children. Despite the 
plain words of the Constitution to the contrary,6s Tribe maintains 
that felons equally with the rest of us must have the right to vote; a 
footnote questions whether it is constitutional even to imprison 
felons unless society and the criminal can be shown "conclu-
sively"-that is, to the Court's satisfaction-to benefit from such 
unequal restrictions on liberty.66 
The list goes on, but it is time to consider two fundamental 
questions about Tribe's work. First, what is the proper role of the 
courts for Tribe under the Constitution? Second, what is the sub-
stance of the philosophy that for him undergirds the Constitution? 
IV 
Tribe's willingness to subordinate the text of the Constitution 
to an evolving spirit behind it, his identification of that spirit with 
his own vision of what is truly right, and his eagerness to use judi-
cial authority to implement this vision, combine to leave little in 
American political life that would not be subject to judicial over-
sight, or that the people, acting through their elected representa-
tives, would be free to decide. If "the highest mission of the 
Supreme Court" is, as he states in his first preface, "to form a more 
perfect Union" between rights under the Constitution and what is 
truly right, then there is no question of moral significance for which 
the Court does not hold the final say. His approach to the abortion 
question is exemplary. Even while wandering through four differ-
61. !d. at 1532. 
62. !d. at 1570. 
63. !d. at 1574. 
64. !d. at 1616. 
65. U.S. CosST. amend. XIV. § 2. 
66. L. TRIBE, at 1094 and n.6. 
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ent justifications for Roe over the last fifteen years, Tribe was 
steadfast in his conviction that abortion is a matter that only the 
judiciary can decide. Abortion raises questions of moral rights, 
both of the unborn and of the pregnant woman, and though there is 
really nothing in the text supporting either claim, since questions of 
morality are involved, the Supreme Court must decide them. The 
idea that abortion is a matter for the political branches of govern-
ment to resolve, as it was prior to Roe, is "fatally flawed," for it 
"presumes that fundamental rights can be reduced to political inter-
ests." That the Constitution could be silent on a question of moral 
significance, that the political branches can render sound judgment 
on a question of moral significance, that some such questions can 
best be handled by the political branches-all of this seems to es-
cape him. It would be intolerable to allow state legislatures to han-
dle a question of such importance, he tells us, with some favoring 
the rights of the fetus and others the rights of the pregnant woman. 
Then with a good ear for cadence but a bad eye for historical paral-
lel, he blithely intones "Lincoln's warning, voiced on a previous oc-
casion when the nation was deeply divided over a different issue of 
fundamental liberty, that the Union could not long endure 'half free 
and half slave.' "67 Tribe does not inconvenience his point by men-
tioning the Court's "solution" to that issue of liberty, the Dred Scott 
decision. 
Tribe can make appealing a world where courts rule on the 
really big questions, and he can, as he did so successfully at the 
Bork hearings, make fearful the prospect of government without 
such judicial oversight. After all, who wants to live under a govern-
ment that is free to do wrong? But the claim on which he bases 
judicial authority, that it might bring about his "more perfect 
Union" between what is truly right and what is right under the 
Constitution, is a claim that is destructive of constitutional democ-
racy. The political branches, under Tribe's approach, forfeit au-
thority to the judiciary because they know less of what is right than 
does the Court. But if he is serious about this claim to rule on the 
basis of knowledge, the Court must forfeit authority to the perfect 
philosopher, the one who truly knows what is right. Only if we 
abandon all formal authority to this philosopher and make him ab-
solute king, as Plato taught in the Republic, will there be that per-
fect union of legal rights and what is truly right. Michael Walzer, 
whose moral philosophy is not far from Tribe's, but who is much 
more astute on the nature of authority, made the point forcefully. 
The claim of the people to rule "is most persuasively put ... not in 
67. /d. at 1351. 
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terms of what the people know, but in terms of who they are. They 
are the subjects of the law, and if the law is to bind them as free men 
and women, they must also be its makers. . . . They may not know 
the right thing to do, but they claim a right to do what they think is 
right. "6s 
Tribe's logic on judicial authority, however, is one of conven-
ience and not of consistency, for he is unwilling to see authority 
drift out of the Court's hands and into those of a perfect philoso-
pher, or of anyone else. Even when the Court does not know the 
right thing to do, Tribe would have the people recognize its claim to 
do what it thinks is right. What he finds intolerable is a similar 
claim to authority by the people themselves, or their elected re-
presentatives. 
Tribe's view of judicial authority, in short, leaves no place for 
constitutional government and precious little for democracy. But 
perhaps even more grievous than this substitution of rule by judges 
for the rule of the Constitution, is the substitution of his new vision 
of human personality for the traditional one underlying the Consti-
tution. As we have seen, according to Tribe's philosophic history of 
the Constitution, it is only in the last two or three decades, with the 
doctrines of autonomy and equality, that the Court and commenta-
tors have begun to develop the idea of human personality that 
would, in his view, justify the entire enterprise of constitutional 
government. 
By his criticism of the doctrines of earlier eras, Tribe would 
lead us to expect an emphasis upon substance. Certainly that is the 
promise of his rhetoric. He tells us, for instance, that equality 
"makes non-circular commands and imposes non-empty constraints 
only to the degree that we are willing to posit substantive ideals."69 
On this point, Tribe is correct,70 for without this substance, claims 
of equality wrap us in the following sort of loop: Jack and Jill are 
equal so they should be treated equally. In what respect are they 
equal? Equal moral worth. What is the content of this moral 
worth? That they should be treated equally. And in what respect 
are they equal? It should be noted that the founders did not make 
this mistake, for the Declaration of Independence is quite explicit 
about the substantive respect in which we are equal. They held this 
equality to consist not in some circular reference to equal moral 
worth, but in each of us having unalienable rights. 
The idea of natural rights, as one would expect, is a mere his-
68. Philosophy and Democracy. 9 PoL THEORY 379, 383 (1981). 
69. L. TRIBE, at 1436. See also 1514. 
70. See Westen. The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
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torical curiosity for Tribe and currently a barrier to real justice. 71 
For him the real substance of constitutional equality lies in the "an-
tisubjugation principle." Yet as Tribe develops this principle, we 
observe it looping back to the starting point of equality. "The core 
value of this principle" he proclaims, as if he were supplying con-
tent, "is that all people have equal worth. "n Equal worth in what 
respect? That "no citizen is 'more equal' than any other," he re-
plies. Where's the beef? Perhaps we would do better to look for 
substance in Tribe's idea of autonomy. After all, it is here that he 
insists most emphatically that we are given "an idea of the 'human' 
and a conception of 'being' not merely contemplated but re-
quired. "73 But where the claims of autonomous personality must be 
stated with greatest force, on the abortion question, Tribe simply 
points back to equality's antisubjugation principle. 
If Tribe's conceptions of equality and autonomy are circular 
and empty, how is it that they can have such apparent force? For 
with these conceptions Tribe would batter down so called "legal 
hierarchies" and void laws "subjugating" one person's lifestyle ac-
cording to the public's idea of good character. And behind these 
conceptions lies the mainstream of today's academic jurisprudence. 
Ronald Dworkin,74 Bruce Ackerman,7s and John Rawls76-the 
neo-Kantian school as a whole-give virtually the identical mean-
ings as Tribe to the rights of liberty and equality. Despite the 
breadth of their support in contemporary academe, the force of 
these rights is illusory. The moral confidence of these "main-
stream" advocates hinges on their dogmatic doubt that we can ever 
know what is good for man and woman or that there even is such a 
thing as the human good; the apparent force of their principles de-
rives from the impotence of their idea of reason. 77 Regarding lib-
erty they ask, if we can know nothing about the good, or the good 
does not exist, what reason do you have to impose your judgments 
of "good character" on me? Regarding equality, they ask if all dis-
tributions based on character, talent, and merit are groundless, why 
should you have more than I? Because we cannot give a reason for 
constraints, we are free; because we cannot give a reason for hierar-
chy or inequality, we are equal. 
71. See. e.g .. TRIBE, supra note 45 at 238-45. 
72. L. TRIBE, at 1515. 
73. !d. at 1308. 
74. TAKtSG RIGHTS SERIOCSLY 272-73 (1978). 
75. SOCIAL JCSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE ll (1980). 
76. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 and 83 ( 1971 ). 
77. One of the balder statements comes from Ackerman: ''But can we know anything 
about the good0 The hard truth is this: There is no meaning in the bowels of the universe.'' 
Ackerman, supra note 75. at 368. 
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These claims display what we might call the friendly face of 
nihilism. For it is from such claims of the moral arbitrariness of all 
judgments about the human good that Rawls gives us "the original 
position, "7s Ackerman the "neutral dialogue, "79 and Dworkin his 
"serious rights,"so and from such claims they promise equal liberty 
and fair distribution. Yet the promise is illusory. For if there is no 
human good or knowledge of it, one might with equal logic con-
clude there is no reason for me not to impose my will on yours. 
And the only meaning of equality is that we are equally worthless.st 
For the past three centuries, liberalism gained its moral author-
ity not just by its rejection of arbitrary restrictions and false claims 
of hierarchy, but by its release thereby of a human character worthy 
of admiration and respect. Recognizing that the human good is 
vast and diverse, that reason cannot discern and express all ele-
ments of this good with clarity and confidence, that for the most 
part, and certainly at its higher reaches, the good can only be an 
object of choice, not of coercion, American liberalism pointed the 
way up mostly by indirection, by checking the path down, that is, 
by prohibiting license. But occasionally we find the beauty of exem-
plary character so moving that we erect monuments in its praise, as 
we did with the Lincoln Memorial. It was before this monument 
and to this still living tradition of American liberalism that Martin 
Luther King appealed when he spoke of his dream of an America 
where each will be judged not by the color of his skin, but by the 
content of his character. The derailment of American liberalism 
and the destitution its moral authority has suffered in the last two 
decades are exhaustively displayed in this work by Laurence Tribe. 
For he would have us judged by the color of our skin and decisively 
not by the content of our character. 
78. J. RAWLS. supra note 75, esp. at 11-22. 
79. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 74, esp. at 8-12. 
80. R. DwoRKIN. supra note 73, and supra note 19. 
81. I develop these propositions more systematically in Can Liberals Punish?, 82 AM. 
POL SCI. REV. 822 (1988). 
